From e521f14cc4d986c2ad400abff3d6cb7ff784b775 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chris McDonough Date: Sat, 19 Oct 2013 15:57:33 -0400 Subject: add admonishment against secret sharing --- docs/narr/security.rst | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+) (limited to 'docs/narr/security.rst') diff --git a/docs/narr/security.rst b/docs/narr/security.rst index 6517fedf8..9884bb1dc 100644 --- a/docs/narr/security.rst +++ b/docs/narr/security.rst @@ -669,3 +669,31 @@ following interface: After you do so, you can pass an instance of such a class into the :class:`~pyramid.config.Configurator.set_authorization_policy` method at configuration time to use it. + +.. _admonishment_against_secret_sharing: + +Admomishment Against Secret-Sharing +----------------------------------- + +A "secret" is required by various components of Pyramid. For example, the +:term:`authentication policy` below uses a secret value ``seekrit``:: + + authn_policy = AuthTktAuthenticationPolicy('seekrit', hashalg='sha512') + +A :term:`session factory` also requires a secret:: + + my_session_factory = SignedCookieSessionFactory('itsaseekreet') + +It is tempting to use the same secret for multiple Pyramid subsystems. For +example, you might be tempted to use the value ``seekrit`` as the secret for +both the authentication policy and the session factory defined above. This is +a bad idea, because in both cases, these secrets are used to sign the payload +of the data. + +If you use the same secret for two different parts of your application for +signing purposes, it may allow an attacker to get his chosen plaintext signed, +which would allow the attacker to control the content of the payload. Re-using +a secret across two different subsystems might drop the security of signing to +zero. Keys should not be re-used across different contexts where an attacker +has the possibility of providing a chosen plaintext. + -- cgit v1.2.3